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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KARYL I. McKEAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CASE NO. 13954

v.
THOMAS M. McKEAN,
Defendant-Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the plaintiff Karyl I. McKean
from a decree of divorce entered in the Third District Court
by the Honorable Ernest R. Baldwin and from his denial of her
motion to alter or amend judgment, or in the alternative for
a new trial.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court entered a decree of divorce for both
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the Defendant and the Plaintiff in this action.

Thereafter,

Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend judgment or in the
alternative for a new trial.

Except for minor modifications,

this motion is denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on April 3, 1948.
This divorce action was filed in June, 1973, and the decree
of divorce finally entered on the 18th of November, 1974. At
the time of the divorce trial there were two minor children
living at home, Scott T. McKean and Sara Liza McKean.
As pointed out in Appellant1s brief, Defendant Thomas
A. McKean is employed as a sales manager for Cate Equipment
Company.

Plaintiff Karyl I. McKean has been employed as a

secretary to the Superintendent of Transportation in the Utah
Parks and as a sales representative for Avon Products.

The

latter job was held by her from the summer of 1970 through
February of 1973 (TR. 109). During a part of her employment
with Avon Products, she enjoyed the position of team captain,
charged with the supervision of seventeen representatives
(TR. 167).
It is true that Plaintiff submitted a report letter from
Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, M.D. (Exhibit 21P) wherein the doctor
noted that due to the fracture of Mrs. McKean!s wrist, "she
still has moderate stiffness of the wrist and fingers and some
pain."

The doctor then went on to find that he anticipated ap-

proximately a 10% permanent loss of function of the hand and
wrist.

Notwithstanding, this disability, it is apparent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintifffs ability to type is not seriously impeded as she
typed numerous trial exhibits including inventories of property and recapitulations of expenses (TR. 84-85, See Exhibits
5P, 6P, 7P, 8P, IIP, 12P, 15P and 17P).
In the decree of divorce the trial judge effectively
divided the property of the parties with 507o awarded to the
Plaintiff and 507o awarded to the Defendant.

Plaintiff had the

further right to remain in the home of the parties until the
last minor child reaches majority or Plaintiff remarries, at
which time the home is to be sold and Defendant is to receive
his portion of the equity.

The home is paid for and Plaintiff's

only obligation while living there is for maintenance and taxes
(TR. 52).
Defendant was found to be earning a net monthly income
of $1200 not including bonuses.

Plaintiff was awarded alimony

in the amount of $300 per month plus child support in the amount
of $150 per child per month for a total of $600 per month.

In

addition Plaintiff was awarded one-half of Defendants future
bonuses.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN
ITS FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH SUPPORT
A DECREE OF DIVORCE IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
The trial court's findings of fact are supported by the
evidence and are sufficient to support the award of a decree of
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divorce to Defendant.
The burden is upon the Appellant to show error in the
court below, as in divorce proceedings, the trial court's
order and findings are endowed with a presumption of validity.
(Stone v. Stone, 19 Ut.2d 378, 380, 431 P.2d 802, 803 (1967)).
It has long been recognized that the presiding judge
in the trial court is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and to appropriately weigh the evidence
introduced at trial.

This rule of review was enunciated by the

court in Greener v. Greener, 116 Ut.571, 212 P.2d 194 (1949),
where the court stated:
The trial judge had the witnesses before
him. He could note their demeanor on the stand,
judge their ability to register and retain impressions and to transmit them intelligently and
to their candor or lack of it. In cases in which
the emotions of the parties are apt to influence
their testimony, the opportunity to observe them
in the courtroom and especially on the witness
stand is of great importance. (116 Ut. at 585,
212 P.2d at 202).
Furthermore, in a case where the evidence is in conflict,
an appellate court will assume that the trial court believed the
evidence which supports the finding, and will view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.

(Stone,

supra, 19 lit. 2d at 380, 431 P. 2d at 803).
With these rules of review in mind, the findings and
order of the trial court in a divorce proceeding will be modified only if the evidence clearly preponderates against them
or unless the decree is grossly inequitable.

(Christensen v.
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Christensen, 21 Ut.2d 263, 265, 444 P.2d 511, 512 (1969)).
Plaintiff-Appellant alleges that the evidence does not
support Finding No. 4 (TR, 61). This argument appears to be
based on three allegations:

(1) That Plaintff's testimony

effectively rebutted Defendant's testimony to the effect that
she had not performed her marital duties; (2) That Defendant
did not testify as to the emotional distress he suffered as a
result of Plaintiff's denial of sexual relations; and (3) That
explicit testimony about fights or arguments is absent.
As to the first allegation, when an appellate court is
presented with a conflict in evidence, the court will assume
the trial judge believed the evidence which supports the finding.

Plaintff concedes that Defendant gave testimony to sup-

port this finding.

Thus, in this case, it must be assumed that

the trial judge accepted the testimony of the Defendant, rather
than that of the Plaintiff on this issue.
The fact that Defendant did not provide explicit testimony about the emotional distress suffered as a result of
Plaintiff's denial of conjugal relations does not compel a
modification of the trial court's finding.

It would seem that

the trial judge could take judicial notice of the fact that
denial of sexual relations caused the Defendant emotional distress .
The trial judge was in a position to note the demeanor
of the Defendant at the time he testified to the lack of physical
affection on the part of his wife.

Furthermore, the trial judge
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could draw on his knowledge of the circumstances surrounding
the dissolution of the marital relationship and upon any evidence
which was relevant to the character of the relationship prior
to its breakdown.

Thus, the inference that Defendant suffered

emotional distress is not unsupported.
Plaintiff-Appellant's third allegation, that the finding
that Plaintiff upset Defendant in arguments and fights is
without support, must likewise fail.

The Plaintiff herself

testified to the existance of severe marital discord (TR. 171).
Again, the advantaged position of the trial judge should
be recognized, and the findings of the trial court will not be
modified absent evidence which clearly preponderates against
them.
Findings of Fact Nos. 3 and 4 are not in logical conflict with each other.

Both parties testified that their

amorous advances were refused by the other party.

(TR. 122,

196, 197, 246). The testimony contemplates separate occurences.

As the refusals occurred at different times, each party

could have suffered emotional distress upon refusal by the
other party and yet have failed to respond to the other party's
advances on a subsequent occasion.
The findings and judgment of the trial court should be
modified only if the evidence clearly preponderates against
them or the decree works such an injustice that equity and
good conscience demand revision.

Such is not the case here.
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POINT II
THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT AWARDED PLAINTIFF WAS
BOTH PROPER AND WITHIN THE COURT'S DISCRETION
In an action for divorce, the trial court has wide discretion in fashioning an award of alimony and child support.

Its

decision will not be modified on appeal absent clear injustice
or inequity which amounts to an abuse of discretion.
. In Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Ut.2d 286, 422 P.2d 192
(1967) the court recognized the great degree of discretion allowed the trial court and noted the limited circumstances under
which the judgment might be modified.

The court stated:

...the policy to which we adhere...[is]...
to the effect that the trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion in ...[divorce cases]
... and that his judgment should not be changed
lightly, and in fact, not at all, unless it works
such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion. (18 Ut.2d at
287, 427 P.2d at 192, 193) (emphasis added).
Although in Anderson, supra, the court considered only
the division of property and an award of alimony, the standard
is much the same for review of a child support award, as is
reflected in Knighton v. Knighton, 15 Ut.2d 55, 387 P.2d 91
(1963).

In Knighton, the court stated, in reference to the

amount of child support:
... [t]his court should indulge every presumption in favor of sustaining the action of the
trial court and will be reluctant to interfere
therewith, doing so only for the clearest abuse
of discretion or violation of established principles of law. (15 Ut,2d at 56, 387 P.2d at 92).
In this case Plaintiff argues, in essence, that modification of the decree is in order because Plaintiff may receive
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less than one-half of Defendants total net income because she
has to pay taxes on a portion of what she receives.
What Plaintiff has failed to consider is that child
support payments received by her from Defendant are taxable
to Defendant, not the Plaintiff.
Even if it is assumed that Plaintiff will receive less
than one-half of Defendant's income, this is not a basis for
overturning the trial court!s order.
The award of alimony and child support is based on
various factors, including the duration of the marriage, the
ages of the parties, their standard of living, considerations
relative to the children, the money and property they possess
and how it was acquired, and their present and potential incomes.
(Anderson, supra, 18 U.2d at 287, 422 P.2d at 192). The trial
court judge is in the best position to ascertain and evaluate
these relevant circumstances.
At no time has this court called for calculation of
alimony and child support solely on a proportionate basis.

In

each case the needs of the parties and the children are considered.
Plaintiff does not assert that the alimony and child
support award of the trial court is inadequate in view of the
needs of Plaintiff and her children, only that Defendant may
retain more than one-half of his earnings.
The trial court considered the needs and requirements
of the parties in calculating alimony and child support.
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analysis should remain undisturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN ITS DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
An equitable division of marital property is developed
through an examination of the relevant circumstances in each
particular case rather than through application of an arithmetical percentage.

(Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Ut.2d 79, 82, 296

P.2d 977, 979 (1956).
Analysis of the relevant circumstances is within the
province of the trial judge.

Due to his advantaged position,

he is given considerable latitude of discretion in the division
of property.

The decision of the trial court will not be

modified unless it causes such clear injustice or inequity as
to amount to an abuse of discretion.

(Anderson v. Anderson,

18 Ut.2d 286, 287, 422 P.2d 192, 192, 193 (1967)).
This court has recoginzed the wide discretion of the
trial court and the fact that differing circumstances require
different allocations of marital property.

In Blair v. Blair,

40 Ut.306, 121 P.19 (1912), the court affirmed a property division which awarded only $4,500 to the wife while granting
$40,000 to the husband.

At the other end of the spectrum, in

Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Ut.2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956), the court
affirmed an award of in excess of $20,000 to the wife and approximately $500 to the husband.

Clearly, division of marital

property should not be bound to an inflexible percentage formula.
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In the case at bar, the court effectively divided the
property of the parties between them on the basis of 507o to
the Plaintiff and 50% to the Defendant.

The trial court did

not accept the Plaintiff's contention that Defendant's interest
in a retirement fund was an item of property which should be
divided between the parties for a good reason.

The retirement

fund is not available to Mr. McKean until he retires at age
65 or becomes permanently disabled (TR. 105-106).

It has most

of its assets tied into the stock market and the value it will
have at the time it is finally available to Mr. McKean is something which cannot be established until it is available.

The

trial court considered the retirement fund in the nature of a
source of future income from Defendant to insure the continued
payment of alimony upon his retirement.

It is for this reason

that the decree of divorce provided that Min the event that
Defendant should quit his job or in any way effect his receipt
of his vested interest in the said retirement fund with his present employer Cate Equipment Company, Defendant is ordered to
notify the court and the Plaintiff immediately.M

(TR. 54). In

a sense, the retirement fund may be considered as future income
for Defendant to insure the continued payment of alimony upon
his retirement.

Thus, Plaintiff benefits from the retirement

fund as does the Defendant.

This was the thought stated by the

trial court at the hearing on Plaintiff's motion to alter or
amend the judgment when the judge made this statement, "What
I have observed, I have heard 50 of these since, that his
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retirement fund went to her benefit if he did retire with that
retirement coming, the benefits of what are received will go to
apply to the support payments to the wife.11

(TR. 273).

The division of the equity in the marital home with half
to Plaintiff and half to Defendant and subject to her right of
possession, is not inequitable.

No evidence was presented at

trial which indicates that Plaintiff must lower her standard
of living upon sale of the home.

Even is this were the case,

division of marital property rests on numerous standards, rather
than solely on the maintenance of one party at an accustomed
social elevation.

In this case the court took cognizance of

those factors, and in the exercise of its discretion divided
the marital property accordingly.
Plaintiff has not argued that the division of property
is inequitable, only that it may cause inconvenience.

Incon-

venience does not compel modification of the decree of divorce.
The discretion of the trial court has not been abused and the
division of marital property should not be modified.
POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
The award of attorneys!s fees lies within the wide discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear abuse of discretion.
407, 409, 424

P.2d 150, 151 (1967)).

(Bader v. Bader, 18 Ut.2d
In the case at hand there

was no abuse of discretion.
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In the exercise of it's discretion the trial court may
consider all factors relevant to a certain issue.

In this case

the division of marital property left each party on essentially
an equal footing in regard to liquid assets.

Plaintiff receives

approximately one-half of all Defendant's income, actual and
potential.

Finally, the trial court found that neither party

was without fault in this action (TR. 60, 61).
Under all of the foregoing circumstances, the order that
each party be required to pay his or her own attorney's fees
and costs is well within the discretion of the trial judge.
POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL
Denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewable only
for abuse of discretion.

(Uptown Appliance & Radio Co., Inc.

v. Flint, 122 Ut. 298, 302-303, 249 P.2d 826, 828 (1952)).
The standards of review applicable to the various allegations
contained in Plaintiff's motion are set out in the matters
argued above.

Through application of these rules of review

to the present case, it is clear there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of Plaintiff's motion.

The ruling of the

trial court should remain undisturbed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the
division of marital property, the award of alimony, child
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support or attorney's fees, nor in its denial of Plaintifffs
motion for a new trial.

The trial court did not err in its

award of divorce to Defendant.
The above arguments make it clear that Plaintiff has
not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to
the findings and judgment of the trial court in a divorce
action.

On this basis the judgment of the court below should

be affirmed.

Plaintiff-Appellant!s request for a new trial

should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
JERMAN & DART

B. L. DARTf JR.
Attorney for Respondent
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